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RACIAL QUOTAS AND THE JURY
ALBERT W. ALSCHULERt
I. SOME HISTORY
Few statements are more likely to evoke disturbing images of
American criminal justice than this one: "The defendant was tried
by an all-white jury."
This statement might bring to mind the Scottsboro boys-un-
educated African-American youths riding on a freight train
through Jackson County, Alabama, in 1931; victors in a fight with
white youths on the train; charged after their arrests with raping
two white women; rushed to judgment before all-white juries; and
sentenced to death.' The state's denial of effective counsel to
these defendants led to the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v.
Alabama,2 in which the Court held for the first time that the
Constitution affords a right to counsel in state capital proceedings.
Following the ruling in Powell, following another Supreme Court
decision three years later condemning racial discrimination in the
selection of a ScottsbQro defendant's jury on retrial,3 and follow-
ing a supposed rape victim's repudiation of her charges, further
retrials before all-white juries produced new convictions. Pleas
from Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt for gubernatorial pardons
proved unavailing. The last of the Scottsboro defendants to be
released from prison was paroled in 1950. That same year, Ala-
bama sought the extradition of another who had escaped to Michigan.4
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1. The case of the youngest of the nine defendants, a 13-year-old, ended in a mis-
trial. Some jurors voted to accept the prosecutor's recommendation of a life sentence
while others insisted upon the death penalty.
2. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
3. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 596-99 (1935).
I. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTrSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH
412-13 (1969); JAMES E. GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTrSBORO 380-81 (1994).
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One also might think of an earlier time than Scottsboro and
of the Ku Klux Klan's epidemic of violence against African-Amer-
icans and white Republicans in the years following the Civil War.
Senator John Sherman, a supporter of the Ku Klux Act of 1871,
recited a series of atrocities in the South and noted that "from the
beginning to the end in all this extent of territory no man has
ever been convicted or punished for any of these offenses, not
one."' One of several southern judges who offered evidentiary
support for Sherman's allegations declared, "In nine cases out of
ten the men who commit the crimes constitute or sit on the grand
jury, either they themselves or their near relatives or friends, sym-
pathizers, aiders, or abettors .... ."
Sherman later supported the 1875 federal statute that out-
lawed racial discrimination in state jury selection.7 Like other
Republican leaders, he recognized that all-white juries would serve
as instruments of oppression not only when African-American
litigants came before them but also when white jurors closed their
eyes to the use of terror and violence to enforce America's racial
caste system. As an African-American commentator said in 1912,
the problem is "not so much that the negro fails to get justice
before the courts" as that "too often ... the ... white man...
escapes it."8 Gunnar Myrdal's landmark 1944 study of race in
America declared, "It is notorious that practically never have
white lynching mobs been brought to court in the South, even
when the killers are known to all in the community and are men-
tioned by name in the local press."9
Although the Scottsboro defendants escaped execution, the link between all-white
juries and racial disparity in the imposition of capital punishment in the South has been
incontestable. Between 1930 and 1977, of the 62 men whom Georgia executed for rape,
all but four were African-Americans. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 332 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Petitioner at 56, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (No. 75-5444)).
5. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 157-58 (1871).
6. Id. (quoting Judge Russel).
7. Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336-37 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988)).
8. EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 179 (1984) (quoting William H. Thomas,
The Negro and Crime, Speech at the Southern Sociological Congress, Nashville (May
1912)).
9. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACY 552-53 (1944).
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One's thoughts might turn to a time more recent than
Scottsboro-the summer of 1955, when in Money, Mississippi,
Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old African-American visitor from
Chicago, accepted a dare to speak to a white woman." "Bye,
Baby," he said. Several days later, Till's mangled body was discov-
ered in the Tallahatchie River. Roy Bryant, the husband of the
white woman, and J.W. Milam, the woman's brother, were charged
with Till's murder. The principal evidence against them was the
testimony of an African-American, Mose Wright. An all-white jury
took slightly more than an hour to acquit the defendants. One
juror explained, "If we hadn't stopped to drink pop, it wouldn't
have taken that long."" Following the defendants' acquittal, they
sold their story to a journalist for $4,000. Bryant and Milam said
that they had meant merely to frighten Till but "had" to kill him
when he refused to beg for mercy. 2 During the next decade, as
large-scale civil rights activity came to the South, all-white juries
failed to convict the defendants accused of killing Medgar Evers,
Viola Liuzzo, and Lemuel Penn. 3
Talk of all-white juries might evoke a time still closer to the
present. In Miami in 1980, four white police officers were tried on
charges that they had beaten to death an African-American arrest-
ed for a traffic offense. The defendants' attorneys, acting together,
struck every potential African-American juror, and the all-white
jury that their challenges produced acquitted the officers. The
Miami riots followed. Four years later, another Miami police offi-
cer was charged with manslaughter in the death of an African-
American suspect. Again, the defense attorney's strikes produced
an all-white jury; again the defendant was acquitted; and again the
acquittal sparked public outcry. 4
In thinking of race and juries, the events of April 29, 1992,
are likely to be close to mind. On that date, a California jury with
no African-American members failed to convict any of four Los
10. See JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS,
1954-1965, at 39-52 (1987).
11. STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETr TILL
42 (1988).
12. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 42.
13. For an indication of the strength of the evidence in one of these cases, see
Michal R. Belknap, The Legal Legacy of Lemuel Penn, 25 HoW. L.L 467 (1982).
14. See William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the
Patient, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 97, 153-54.
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Angeles police officers of misconduct despite the fact that most of
these officers had been videotaped kicking and beating Rodney
King, an African-American suspect, as he lay on the ground. The
jury's decision triggered the worst race riot in American history, 5
two days of violence that cost fifty-eight lives and nearly one
billion dollars in property damage. 6
Two conclusions about juries composed entirely of members
of America's majority race seem almost too obvious to mention.
First, in many communities, these juries are mistrusted; and sec-
ond, the mistrust has deep historical roots. 7
II. THE HENNEPIN COUNTY QUOTAS
A year before the 1992 Los Angeles riots, an all-white grand
jury in Minneapolis, Minnesota, ekonerated Dan May, a white
police officer who had shot and killed Tycel Nelson, a seventeen-
year-old African-American suspect. 8 The grand jury's no-bill of
Officer May and the protests and tension that followed were
among the circumstances that prompted a Hennepin County task
force to recommend, 9 and the Minnesota Supreme Court to ap-
prove,2° a plan for abolishing all-white grand juries in Hennepin
County. Governments can reduce the likelihood of all-white juries
in many ways,2' but there is only one way to end them. The
15. William Julius Wilson, Crisis and Challenge: Race and the New Urban Poverty, U.
CHI. REC., Dec. 8, 1994, at 2, 4.
16. See Seth Mydans, Prosecutor Seeks Retrial of Officer in King Beating, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 1992, at A20; Neal R. Peirce, Look Homeward, City of Angels, 24 NAT'L
J. 1250 (1992). Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles voiced the sentiment of many Amer-
icans when he said of the videotape, "We saw what we saw. What we saw was a crime."
Bill Boyarsky, Ashes of a Mayor's Dream, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at B2. A federal
court jury composed of nine whites, two African-Americans, and one Latino later convict-
ed two of the officers involved in the beating of violating Rodney King's civil rights. See
Jim Newton, Koon, Powell Get 2 1/2 Years in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at Al;
Jim Newton, Racially Mixed Jury Selected for King Trial, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at
Al.
17. This mistrust in fact extends to some juries not composed entirely of members of
America's majority race. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
18. Jill Hodges, Officer Cleared in Shooting: Grand Jury Brings No Charges in Death
of Tycel Nelson, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Mar. 27, 1991, at Al.
19. HENNEPIN COUNTY ATTORNEY'S TASK FORCE ON RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE
GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 45 (1992) [hereinafter HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT].
20. See Maureen M. Smith, Pilot Plan to Assure That Each Grand Jury Has Two
Minorities, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 29, 1993, at B6. Prior to the supreme court's
action, a majority of Hennepin County's 54 district judges had voted to support imple-
mentation of the Task Force proposal.
21. For example, governments can use more inclusive jury source lists, eliminate or
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Hennepin County Task Force proposed racial quotas.22 Because
the use of quotas in selecting petit jurors would not pose signifi-
cantly different constitutional issues from those raised by their use
to select grand jurors, the Hennepin County proposal offers a
restrict peremptory challenges, increase jury size, reconfigure the geographic vicinages
from which jurors are drawn, take steps to encourage or enforce compliance with jury
summonses, make jury service more convenient or remunerative, require judges to take
racial demography into account when ordering a change of venue, or "oversample" mi-
norities in sending jury summonses and questionnaires. See Nancy J. King, Racial
Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury
Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 752-56, 771-72 (1993). In December 1993, the Hen-
nepin County District Court, following a recommendation of the Hennepin County Task
Force, HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 58, began a day-care pro-
gram for the children of grand and petit jurors. Smith, supra note 20.
22. HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 45. The Task Force pro-
posal remains unimplemented. Officials are following potentially relevant constitutional
litigation in Georgia, seeking a formal amendment of the Minnesota Jury Management
Rules, MINN. R. 628.41 (1992), and attempting to devise and to secure the approval of
procedures for testing the proposal's constitutionality.
In Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), the Supreme Court reaffirmed earlier
rulings that racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury cannot be harmless
error. The habeas corpus petitioner in Vasquez had been indicted 23 years before his
case came before the Supreme Court. He had been found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt by a properly constituted trial jury. The Court nevertheless set aside his conviction
because the grand jury that indicted him had been selected in a discriminatory manner.
Id. at 266. In light of Supreme Court decisions like Vasquez, a ruling forbidding on
constitutional grounds the use of racial quotas in jury selection would jeopardize the
conviction of any defendant indicted by a grand jury selected partly through the use of
such a quota. Although Michael 0. Freeman, the Hennepin County Attorney, supports
the proposal of the Hennepin County Task Force, he is reluctant to implement it in all
cases and thus run the risk that his office later would lose many convictions of fairly
tried defendants. Freeman's office has considered whether the proposal might be imple-
mented for just one grand jury-a grand jury that would hear less serious cases than
those considered by other Hennepin County grand juries. Even if partial implementation
of the proposal were feasible, however, customary plea-negotiation practices in minor
felony cases might make the generation of a test case unlikely, see Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) (holding that the entry of a competently counseled guilty plea
bars challenge to the composition of a grand jury); and for the County Attorney to
withhold an otherwise appropriate plea agreement simply to generate a test case would
seem unfair. Perhaps, if a judge refused on constitutional grounds to impanel a grand
jury chosen in accordance with the Task Force proposal, a mandamus action filed by the
County Attorney against the judge would provide a suitable vehicle for testing the
proposal's constitutionality.
The Justices who joined the majority opinions in Vasquez and like cases apparently
considered the retrial of improperly indicted but fairly tried defendants an important
symbol of America's commitment to overcoming its history of racism. These Justices
probably did not realize that their rulings would greatly inhibit all forms of color-con-
scious affirmative action in jury selection. I am as convinced as I was 20 years ago that
these decisions are unfortunate. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense
Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1975).
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useful vehicle for assessing the issues raised by affirmative action
in the selection of both grand and petit jurors.'
Most felony prosecutions in Hennepin County are commenced
by information rather than by grand jury indictment, but all first-
degree murder cases must be submitted to a grand jury.24 Al-
though only 9% of the adults in Hennepin County are people of
color, a majority of the homicide cases presented to the grand jury
23. The use of quotas to select petit juries would have been a more significant inno-
vation in the criminal justice system. Grand juries no longer initiate most felony prosecu-
tions; unlike most petit juries, they need not act by unanimous vote and typically may
act by majority vote; their function is to determine the existence of probable cause rather
than guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; they proceed without an adversary presentation of
evidence; and they often seem dominated by the prosecutors who advise them. MARVIN
FRANKEL & GARY NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 16-24, 67-
71 (1977).
Perhaps the Hennepin County Task Force was asked to focus on grand rather than
petit juries simply because all-white grand juries were a special source of controversy and
concern. In addition, the fact that grand juries are substantially larger than petit juries
might have made the grand jury seem a more appropriate body for the initiation of
affirmative action measures.
In Hennepin County, in which 9% of the adult population are people of color,
HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 27 (1990 census figures), the Task
Force's proposal to include two "minority persons" on every 23-person grand jury, id. at
45, would not afford minority persons greater than proportional representation. The same
statement could be made of a plan to include one minority person on every 6-person
petit jury, but only if one were willing to "round up" a fraction not much greater than
one-half. Treating adult population figures as the appropriate baseline, the expected num-
ber of minority persons on a 6-person Hennepin County petit jury is 0.54. See 51 MINN.
STAT. ANN., Rule 802(i) (West 1993) (authorizing the use of six-person juries in misde-
meanor prosecutions and in felony prosecutions with the defendant's consent). Even with-
out rounding, proportional representation would yield one minority person on every 12-
person petit jury, but guaranteeing the presence of one minority juror could suggest
"tokenism"-or, perhaps, ineffectiveness, if one feared that a single minority juror often
would lack reinforcement in jury deliberations. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462-63 (University of Chicago Press 1971) (1966) (noting
that 12-person juries with three or fewer first-ballot dissenters almost never hang); see
also REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 106--08 (1983) (finding that in a study of
simulated 12-person juries, single holdout jurors abandoned their positions 75% of the
time).
Extension of the Hennepin County Task Force proposal to petit juries would re-
quire judges to draw substitute jurors from a list of minority persons whenever either
peremptory challenges or challenges for cause reduced the number of minority persons
below the required minimum. A lawyer's knowledge that a challenged minority juror
would be replaced by another would reduce the lawyer's incentive to engage in racial
discrimination in jury selection and would have some bearing on whether the lawyer had
engaged in discrimination in fact. Implementation of the proposal would not otherwise af-
fect a court's administration of the requirements of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), and Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
24. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 8.01.
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involve people of color as victims, suspects, or both. Specifically,
in cases presented to Hennepin County grand juries since the end
of 1989, 66% of all victims and 71% of all suspects have been
members of racial or ethnic minorities.'
The methods used to select grand jurors in Hennepin County
are almost certainly constitutional, yet the proportion of minorities
on Hennepin County grand juries in recent years has been 5.3%,
substantially smaller than the proportion of racial minorities in the
adult population.26 Moreover, the county's grand jury selection
methods yield all-white grand juries nearly 40% of the time.27 A
striking fact, then, is that although 71% of the suspects whose
cases come before Hennepin County grand juries are people of
color, 40% of these suspects' cases are heard by bodies of twenty-
three people that include no minority-group members.
Under the Task Force proposal, a questionnaire would ask
prospective grand jurors whether they wished to identify them-
selves as "minority persons."'  No one would probe the prospec-
tive jurors' responses or scrutinize their ancestry. Twenty-one of
the grand jury's twenty-three members 9 would then be selected
25. HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 29.
26. Id. at 27. Hennepin County selects its jurors from driver's license, state identifica-
tion card, and voter registration lists. These lists apparently include more than 98% of
the eligible adult population. Id. at 9, 38. Minority-group members, however, change their
places of residence more frequently than whites. King, supra note 21, at 714. The lists
from which jurors are selected include people who have recently left Hennepin County,
omit people who have recently come into the county, and provide incorrect addresses for
some people who have recently changed residences within the county. See HENNEPIN
COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 38 (suggesting updating voter registration lists
every two years instead of every four years). Minority-group members not only are less
likely than whites to receive jury summonses and questionnaires but also are less likely
to return them. See King, supra note 21, at 714. The members of minority groups also
may be more likely than whites to be excused from jury service on grounds of financial
hardship, responsibility for the care of another, and the like. For some not very helpful
data on these questions, see HENNEPIN COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, EXCUSED JUROR
STUDY: NOVEMBER 1993; HENNEPIN COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, EXCUSED JUROR STUDY:
JUNE 1994 UPDATE; HENNEPIN COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, ANALYSIS OF HENNEPIN
COUNTY JURY DATA: FURTHER EXPLANATION OF DATA PRESENTED TO THE CONFER-
ENCE OF CHIEF JUDGES (1993).
27. Specifically, 26 of 66 grand juries since 1968. HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT,
supra note 19, at 27.
28. See id. at 45.
29. Minnesota, like most other states and the federal government, authorizes smaller
grand juries, see MINN. R. CRiM. P. 18.03; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.41(1) (1993), but
Hennepin County adheres to the number 23-the number of grand jurors that English
law required from the 14th century until England abolished use of the grand jury in
1933. See Jon Van Dyke, The Grand Jury:.Representative or Elite?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 37,
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at random from a list of fifty-five people qualified to serve.30 If
the questionnaires of at least two of these twenty-one jurors re-
vealed that they were "minority persons," the remaining grand
jurors would be selected in the same way that the first twenty-one
had been. If, however, no minority persons or only one were
included in the initial group, officials would draw one or two
grand jurors exclusively from respondents who had identified them-
selves as minority persons. If necessary, the officials could turn to
a second list of fifty-five people or a third or a fourth to ensure
the presence of at least two minority persons on every Hennepin
County grand jury.31 Apart from these officials, no one would
know whether a grand jury had been selected at random or partly
through jurymandering. 32
III. OTHER QUOTAS
The Hennepin County proposal is one of a number of affir-
mative-action jury-selection measures currently under consideration
or already in place in American jurisdictions. In Arizona, a bar
committee has proposed dividing jury lists into subsets by race and
drawing jurors from each subset.33 Some Arizona judges currently
strike trial juries that, in their view, do not include adequate num-
bers of minority jurors.' In DeKalb County, Georgia, jury com-
missioners divide jury lists into thirty-six demographic groups (for
example, black females aged 35 to 44); they then use a computer
to ensure the proportional representation of every group on every
venire.35
38-41 (1976).
30. HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 45.
31. Id.
32. The term "jurymandering" is Jeff Rosen's. See Jeff Rosen, Jurymandering, NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 15.
33. Jeff Barge, Reformers Target Jury Lists, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 26, 26.
34. Id. (noting that in order to include some Hispanic-Americans on an African-
American defendant's jury, Judge B. Michael Dann once impaneled three successive ju-
ries). R. William Ide, then president of the American Bar Association, described in a
recent ABA Journal column the proposals of an ABA task force to reduce racial and
ethnic bias in the justice system. These proposals included "[c]hanging jury selection
practices to ensure proportionate minority representation." R. William Ide III, Eradicating
Bias in the Justice System, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 8.
35. Andrew Kull, Racial Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 17, 18.
A Florida statute requires that, upon a motion of any party, every judge who or-
ders a change of venue "give priority to any county which closely resembles the demo-
graphic composition of the county wherein the original venue would lie." FLA. STAT.
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The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 196836 was
designed to ensure a measure of racial balance in federal jury
panels. The Act requires panels to be drawn from voter registra-
tion rolls or from lists of actual voters unless the use of these
sources would lead to the substantial underrepresentation of a ra-
cial (or other) group. In that event, the Act orders courts to aug-
ment the voting rolls with other sources.37
For ten years, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan maintained a racially balanced jury wheel by sending
extra jury questionnaires to areas in which African-Americans
constituted 65% or more of the population. More recently, this
court has sought demographic balance by removing from the jury
wheel some questionnaires of whites.3"
Similar color-conscious jury selection methods are in use in
other jurisdictions to "balance the box"-that is, to ensure racial
proportionality in the initial pool from which petit and grand
juries are drawn.39 Seeking racial balance in the wheels and box-
es from which petit and grand jurors are drawn appears to be less
controversial than seeking racial balance in juries themselves.4"
The reason for creating racially balanced jury pools, however, is
presumably to make racially balanced juries more likely. Although
departures from the principle of color-blindness may be less visible
when they occur early in the jury selection process, they do not
seem significantly different in principle.
To be sure, the demographics of particular jurisdictions may
make it easier to achieve racial balance in large groups than in
small groups. For example, DeKalb County, Georgia, plainly could
not include representatives of thirty-six demographic categories on
a jury of only twelve people. After attaining a balanbe in a jury
pool that would be unattainable in a jury, officials might reason-
ably leave to chance the extent to which particular groups were
represented on juries.4' In the absence of demographic con-
ANN. § 910.03(2) (West Supp. 1995).
36. Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878
(1988)).
37. See id. § 1863(b)(2); Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805 app. at 815-19 (5th Cir.
1975) (study by Judge Walter P. Gewin, An Analysis of Jury Selection Decisions).
38. See King, supra note 21, at 722-23.
39. Randall Kennedy, The Racial Rigging of Juries, AM. EXPERIMENT, Fall 1994, at
1; see King, supra note 21, at 719-26.
40. See King, supra note 21, at 726.
41. See infra Section VIII(B); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 n.6
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straints, however, the use of quotas to select juries seems no more
objectionable than the use of quotas to select jury pools. If, for
example, a county's population were two-thirds white and one-
third black, providing that only the initial pool need reflect this
balance would seem a hesitant and ineffective way of making
juries more representative. Exorcising the specter of the all-white
jury altogether would appear more sensible. Nevertheless, for
some observers, the use of quotas in jury selection apparently
becomes less troublesome when there remains a sporting chance
that these quotas will not achieve their objective.4' These observ-
ers may share to some degree the posture of some opponents of
affirmative action in jury selection-hoping for racial balance on
juries, at least in some cases, but unwilling to act directly to bring
it about. Somewhat like champions of the ordeal, these observers
appear to trust the gods of Fate, Luck, and Statistics.43
IV. THE VENERABLE QUOTA
The determination of jury membership by demographic quotas
is not new. Before the end of the twelfth century, English charters
promised Jews that disputes between Jews and English subjects
would be resolved by juries composed half of Jews and half of
Englishmen.' These charters originated the English jury de medi-
etate linguae-a jury composed half of Englishmen and half of the
countrymen of an alien party.' The use of mixed juries in cases
(1986) ("[I]t would be impossible to apply a concept of proportional representation to the
petit jury in view of the heterogenous nature of our society.").
42. Color-conscious jury selection methods tend to be less visible at the early stages
of the process partly because they are less effective. A jurisdiction like Hennepin County
might send jury questionnaires to minority-group members at a higher rate than to whites
(because minority-group members are less likely to receive and return them, supra note
26), and this measure might produce a pool of prospective jurors in which the proportion
of minority jurors matched the proportion of minority-group members in the county's
adult population-say, 10%. The random selection of 23 grand jurors from a large pool
engineered to ensure 10% minority-group membership would yield all-white grand juries
9% of the time. Report by Steven D. Penrod to the County Attorney's Office, Hennepin
County, Minnesota (1994) (on file with author).
43. The phrase "Fate, Luck, and Statistics" is appropriated from Andrew G. Deiss,
Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Jury Trial in a Pluralist America 23 (1995) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author).
44. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 4-5, 18, 96-97, 145
(1994).
45. Following England's expulsion of the Jews in 1290, juries de medietate linguae
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involving aliens remained a feature of English law for 700
years.
Members of the Plymouth Colony employed a similar proce-
dure in 1674 when they added six Indians to a jury of twelve
colonists to try three Indians for murder.47 In 1823-in one of
several recorded cases of early American jurymandering-Chief
Justice John Marshall impaneled a jury de medietate linguae to try
an alien charged with piracy and murder.'
Apparently no African-Americans served on juries in the
United States before 1860."9 When Reconstruction governments
were used primarily in cases involving alien merchants. See Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of
One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 848-50 (1976); Deborah A. Ramirez, The
Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of "de Medietate Linguae". A History of a Proposal
for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 1994); Daniel W. Van Ness, Preserving a
Community Voice: The Case for Half-and-Half Juries in Racially-Charged Criminal Cases,
28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 35-37 (1994); see also Peter J. Nelligan & Harry V. Ball,
Ethnic Juries in Hawaii: 1825-1850, 34 Soc. PROCESS IN HAWAII 113 (1992) (describing
the use of mixed juries to resolve disputes between natives and foreigners in 19th-century
Hawaii).
46. Ramirez, supra note 45.
47. Id.
48. United States v. Cartacho, 25 F. Cas. 312, 312-13 (D. Va. 1823) (No. 14,738).
The jury de medietate linguae may not seem closely analogous to the procedures
proposed by the Hennepin County Task Force. The aliens who served on juries de medi-
etate linguae were ineligible to serve on other juries, and the analogous treatment of the
members of minority groups might disqualify them from serving on juries in cases involv-
ing white litigants while guaranteeing that they would constitute half of all jurors in cases
involving minority litigants. This procedure would treat minority-race jurors, like the
aliens who served on juries de medietate linguae, as less than full members of the com-
munity. The history of the jury de medietate linguae could be cited to support the claim
that demographic jurymandering is permissible, but this history is consistent with the
proposition that demographic distinctions among citizens are rarely appropriate.
England, however, did use mixed juries in some cases in which all of the parties
were English. Burgesses sometimes obtained juries composed half of burgesses; disputes
concerning church patronage were tried before juries composed half of clerics and half of
laymen; and university scholars were tried for serious crimes by juries composed half of
freeholders and half of matriculated laymen. James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Spe-
cial Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 168-69 (1983). Early in the 19th century, Jeremy
Bentham recalled the "genius of some now forgotten statesman" who had invented the
jury de medietate linguae and proposed the use of "half-and-half" juries composed of six
gentlemen and six yeomen. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF
PACKING, As APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES, PARTICULARLY IN CASES OF LIBEL LAW
222-26 (Garland Publishing 1978) (1821); Van Ness, supra note 45, at 32-35, 45.
49. The first African-Americans ever to serve on a jury in America were apparently
two who sat in Worcester, Massachusetts, that year. LEON F. LrrwACK, NORTH OF SLAV-
ERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at 94 (1961).
In 1718, however, the Attorney General of Maryland agreed that "negro Jem,"
charged with murder, should be tried by a jury de medietate linguae. WILLIAM KILTY,
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ended the exclusion of African-Americans in the South, they
sometimes mandated racial quotas as well. The first African-Amer-
icans selected for jury service in the South were the six impaneled
along with six whites to try Jefferson Davis for treason. Although
this racially balanced jury was discharged when the government
elected not to prosecute,0 in at least a few southern jurisdictions,
judges and other officials ensured that the earliest integrated juries
were composed half of blacks and half of whites.5'
In South Carolina, where the state legislature required that
grand and petit juries reflect the racial composition of the counties
in which they sat,52 an observer declared in 1869, "The sensation
is peculiar ... to see a Court in session, where former slaves sit
side by side with their old owners on the jury, where white men
are tried by a mixed jury, where colored lawyers plead, and where
white and colored officers maintain order." 3 Statesmen of the
generation that wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
apparently did not consider racially balanced juries discriminato-
ry. 4 Nevertheless, when a black defendant argued in 1879 that
STATUTES FOUND APPLICABLE 152 (1811) (citation supplied by Deborah Ramirez). It is
uncertain whether Jem's race triggered the decision to grant his request for a mixed jury
and whether his jury included African-Americans. My colleague Richard Ross suggests
that racial attitudes in Maryland in the early 18th century make these possibilities unlike-
ly and that "negro Jem" could well have been a subject of the Netherlands, France, or
Spain.
50. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL
OF DEMOCRACY 106 (1994) (citing The First Integrated Jury Impaneled in the United
States, May 1867, 33 NEGRO HIST. BULL. 134 (1933)).
51. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877, at 358 (1988); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth
Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1, 50 n.234 (1990).
52. JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING
RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1877, at 334 (1965).
53. Id. at 329-30 (citing N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1869, at 5).
54. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985):
[R]ace conscious Reconstruction programs were enacted concurrently with the
fourteenth amendment and were supported by the same legislators who favored
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. This history strongly suggests
that the framers of the amendment could not have intended it generally to pro-
hibit affirmative action for blacks or other disadvantaged groups.
The Thirty-Ninth Congress submitted the Fourteenth Amendment to the states in its
current form (with its guarantee that no state shall "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws") rather than in the language proposed by
Thaddeus Stevens: "All national and State laws shall be equally applicable to every citi-
zen, and no discrimination shall be made on account of race and color." ANDREW KULL,
7151995]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:704
the Constitution required his jury venire to be one-third black, the
Supreme Court unanimously rejected his contention.55
Language in some of the Supreme Court's recent opin-
ions-notably City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.5 6 and Shaw v.
Reno57-- indicates that the Court would depart from the probable
"original intention" of Reconstruction statesmen and would subject
Hennepin County-style affirmative action to strict scrutiny. Some
academic commentators have suggested that the Hennepin County
proposal is unconstitutional.58 I believe, however, that a court
attuned to the virtues of judicial restraint and local initiative ought
to uphold the Hennepin County plan. In supporting this position,
my goal will be not to repeat familiar arguments about affirmative
action but to emphasize that affirmative action in the context of
THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 67 (1992).
55. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1879):
It is a right to which every colored man is entitled, that, in the selection ofjurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or property, there shall be no exclusion of
his race, and no discrimination against them because of their color. But this is
a different thing from the right which it is asserted was denied to the petition-
ers by the State court, viz. a right to have the jury composed in part of col-
ored men.
Cf. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 291 (1947) ("Even in the Negro cases, this Court
has never undertaken to say that a want of proportionate representation of groups, which
is not proved to be deliberate and intentional, is sufficient to violate the Constitution.").
That a claim of constitutional entitlement to the use of racial quotas was seriously
pressed in 1879 may indicate that the people who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment were far from endorsing an ideal of color-blindness. Indeed, a federal district
judge, Alexander Rives, had accepted the defendant's claim. See Rives, 100 U.S. at 335
(Field, J., concurring). Judge Rives once observed that in his own court he had "always
ordered mixed juries" and had "not discovered that harm has resulted from it . . . ." 7
CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RE-
CONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888 pt. 2, at 442 (1987) (quoting a statement re-
ported in the Richmond Dispatch, Dec. 12, 1878).
56. 488 U.S. 469, 486-93 (1989).
57. 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824-25, 2829 (1993).
58. See King, supra note 21, at 760-75 (approving of some color-conscious jury selec-
tion methods but apparently disapproving of Hennepin County-style quotas); Memoran-
dum from Dan Farber to Carl Warren (Oct. 8, 1991), in HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 19, app. (doubting that the Hennepin County proposal could satisfy the
standards of Croson but "personally find[ing] the proposal quite reasonable"); Letter from
Fred L. Morrison to Louis N. Smith 3 (Oct. 8, 1991), in HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 19, app. ("[I]t would appear that the proposal would have to meet the
'strict scrutiny' test. None of the rationales put forward seems to reach this high level of
necessity."). But see Letter from Shari Lynn Johnson to Michael 0. Freeman 2 (Oct. 22,
1991), in HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, app. ("The strict scrutiny
standard can be met."); Letter from Roy L. Brooks to Michael 0. Freeman 3 (Oct. 21,
1991), in HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, app. ("[T]he Task Force's
proposal . . . should survive constitutional scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.").
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jury selection presents a different issue from any that the Supreme
Court has considered.
V. JURIES ARE DIFFERENT
The Supreme Court has recognized that the importance of
representative juries justifies a departure from the standards em-
ployed in equal protection litigation to test assertedly discriminato-
ry governmental action. The Court has held that in criminal cases
the systematic exclusion of an identifiable group from jury venires
violates a "fair cross-section requirement" implicit in the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial. In 1940, the Court wrote, "It is
part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments
of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the
community," 9 and in 1975 the Court declared, "[T]he selection
of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the communi-
ty is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial."'  Although the fair cross-section requirement does not
truly require that either juries or jury venires include a cross-sec-
tion of the population (a result that would require the use of
demographic quotas), 1 the Court's test of discrimination under
the Sixth Amendment looks less to purpose and more to effect
than does the test of discrimination that the Court employs in
cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause.62
59. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
60. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
61. In Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, the Court declared that the fair cross-section require-
ment does not require "that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and
reflect the various distinctive groups in the population." Disregarding the fair cross-section
requirement's grounding in the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury (and not to
an impartial jury panel), the Court also has said that the requirement extends only to
the panels from which juries are selected, not to the juries themselves. Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986). Even in the selection of jury panels, the Court has
condemned only the "systematic" exclusion of distinctive groups. See id.; Duren v. Mis-
souri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). "Systematic" exclusion probably does not encompass
repeated "accidental" exclusion. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the
Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 153, 185 n.127 (1989) ("[W]ere the luck of the draw to yield a jury, a jury panel,
or even five consecutive jury panels composed entirely of wealthy Republican women
golfers, their selection probably would not violate the Constitution.").
62. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26 (noting that in equal protection cases, statistical
disparity is evidence of discriminatory purpose that may be rebutted, but that "in Sixth
Amendment fair-cross-section cases, systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an in-
fringement.. ."); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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Juries are distinctive both because affirmative action in jury
selection has special virtues and because it is likely to prove less
costly to individuals and society than affirmative action in other
contexts. Emphasizing the distinctive virtues, Vikram David Amar
has noted the kinship between jury service and voting. He con-
tends that color-conscious jury selection can extend participation in
public affairs more widely and that race-conscious measures to
promote civic participation are easier to square with the Constitu-
tion than other affirmative action measures.'
The distinctive lack of harm of race-conscious jury selection
methods becomes evident upon a review of the ways in which
racial classifications can injure people. A person challenging an
affirmative action program typically has been denied a tangible
benefit-a job, a promotion, a government contract, or admission
to an educational program-largely on the basis of race. Jury
service is in one sense a job, albeit a job that pays less than two
dollars per hour,' and some jurors find their courtroom experi-
ence rewarding. Nevertheless, most prospective jurors attempt to
avoid service,' and because jurors are selected mostly on the
basis of chance, even prospective jurors who would prefer to serve
have little personal expectation or claim to be chosen.
Who might have served on Hennepin County grand juries in
the absence of the county's efforts to achieve racial balance can
never be known. Anyone on the list of qualified jurors might have
been chosen if selection had proceeded at random. Even if some
displaced majority-race juror could learn who he was, however, he
§ 21.2(c)-(d), at 835-38 (student ed. 1985); see also Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
510 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the fair cross-section requirement inval-
idates some practices not condemned by the Equal Protection Clause).
63. See Vikram D. Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin To Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 1995) .(noting also a work-in-progress by Amar and Alan
Brownstein that will explore the issue in greater detail). Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530 (1975) ("Community participation in the administration of the criminal
law . . . is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.").
64. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 593.48 (West 1988) (authorizing the payment of $15 per
day to jurors).
65. See STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN
COURTROOM 14 (1994). Most Americans who are sent jury summonses never appear at
the courthouse because their summonses are not delivered, they ask to be and are ex-
cused, or they ignore the summonses. Two-thirds of the prospective jurors who do appear
do not serve because they ask to be and are excused, lawyers challenge them, or they
are never sent to a courtroom. See id. at 243 n.1.
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would be unlikely to conclude that the county's racial classification
had denied him a significant tangible benefit.'
Apart from any loss of tangible benefits, a racial classification
can injure by stigmatizing, demeaning, or reinforcing group stereo-
types. Again, however, a white person displaced from a grand jury
in order to permit two minority group members to serve along
with twenty-one members of the displaced juror's own race would
be unlikely to conclude that his race had been branded inferior,
that he had been judged not good enough to serve, or that he had
66. Jury service differs in this respect even from the other major form of citizen
participation in government, voting. Unlike a prospective juror, everyone qualified to vote
has a right to vote (not just a right to be free of invidious or irrational discrimination in
the selection of voters from a pool of prospects). Someone with a right to vote may
have a sense of personal injury when geographic gerrymandering or other governmental
action has deliberately given him less "voice" in the affairs of government than has been
accorded others who differ from him in skin color. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) ("The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting
power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."); see also Johnson v.
Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2663 (1994) (holding that preventing dilution of the votes of a
racial minority does not demand dilution of the votes of the racial majority and that
color-conscious geographic districting whose predictable effect is proportional representa-
tion does not offend the Voting Rights Act).
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829-30 (1993), held that racial gerrymandering can
violate the Constitution even when it produces no vote "dilution"; this gerrymandering
can unconstitutionally segregate the voters of different races in different voting districts.
The Hennepin County Task Force proposal, however, far from segregating the members
of different races, would bring them together on grand juries.
A prospective white juror in Hennepin County could not reasonably claim denial of
a voice in government to which she was personally entitled, but she might note some
asymmetry in the treatment of her racial group. This juror might assert an attenuated (or
"diluted") form of vote dilution. Under the Task Force proposal, whites would be limit-
ed, roughly, to proportional representation. HENNEPIN CoUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra
note 19, at 45-46. Hennepin County grand juries could never be much more than 90%
white. But the luck of the draw might yield a grand jury of more than 10% "minority
persons"-even, in truly flukish circumstances, 100%. In other words, although the
Hennepin County quotas would never reduce the number of minority persons below the
number that random selection would have yielded, they sometimes would reduce the
number of whites below this level. This asymmetry might appear troublesome if one
viewed random assignment as the relevant baseline, disregarding asymmetry in the distri-
bution of racial and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the danger that minorities would gain
more power than whites under the Hennepin County proposal is insubstantial, and the
lack of a more rigorous form of proportional representation is not the feature of the
Hennepin County proposal that its critics are likely to find most objectionable. Cf. Unit-
ed Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) ("[A]s long as whites in
Kings County, as a group, were provided with fair representation, we cannot conclude
that there was a cognizable discrimination against whites or an abridgment of their right
to vote on grounds of race.").
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personally been evaluated on the basis of crude group stereo-
types.67
Affirmative action programs sometimes are thought to stigma-
tize, not members of the majority race, but the programs' intended
beneficiaries. These programs may appear to give special consider-
ation to people who would not have qualified for a benefit on the
basis of merit alone. Jury selection rests less on merit than on
chance, however, and a racial quota would merely supplement one
mechanism for promoting community representation (random selec-
tion) with another (deliberate racial balance). This sort of affir-
mative action would not imply that unqualified or marginally qual-
ified people had been given a special boost.
Apart from any injury that affirmative action programs may
inflict on displaced majority-group members or the programs'
intended beneficiaries, these programs sometimes appear to divert
governmental or private enterprises from their primary missions
and to injure the public. As the potential patients of brain and
heart surgeons, for example, we might well be concerned if we
concluded that medical schools were admitting students who they
doubted would be as successful surgeons as the ones they turned
away. There is, however, no reason whatever to suppose that
grand juries designed to include two minority-group members
would accomplish their purposes less effectively than grand juries
selected entirely at random. To the contrary, these grand juries
probably would achieve their goals better. Ensuring the presence
of minority-race jurors seems as likely or more likely to enhance
the quality of grand juries' performance than other departures
from random selection .that the Supreme Court has upheld-for
example, requirements that jurors be upright, intelligent, and well
regarded in their communities.68
Grand and petit juries should to a considerable extent reflect
the will of the community, and their judgments should command
community respect.69 By marshaling a substantial body of opinion
67. In this respect, the Hennepin County proposal does not differ from other affir-
mative action measures. These measures rarely, if ever, brand or stigmatize whites.
68. E.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 353-55 (1970) (upholding a Georgia statute
giving commissioners discretion to eliminate anyone found not "upright" and "intelli-
gent"); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 331-37 (1970) (upholding an Alabama
requirement that jurors be "generally reputed to be honest and intelligent . . . and ...
esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judgment").
69. See infra text accompanying notes 132-37; cf. 2 JAMES WILSON, The Subject Con-
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in support of their rulings, juries help to assure all members of the
community that the awesome power to accuse and convict people
of serious crimes is exercised in a legitimate way. The principal
reasons for impaneling a reasonably large body of jurors are in
fact to ensure a diversity of viewpoints, to increase the likelihood
that the jury will represent all elements of the community, to
promote group deliberation, and to enhance the public's accep-
tance of grand jury rulings. Ensuring some diversity of race and
ethnicity is likely to promote all of these objectives as well.
The proponents of affirmative action in jury selection some-
times have emphasized the appearance of justice as much as (or
more than) the substance of justice." The Supreme Court has
said that the "need for public confidence is especially high in cases
involving race-related crimes. In such cases, emotions in the affect-
ed community will inevitably be heated and volatile. Public confi-
dence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is essential for
preserving community peace in trials involving race-related
crimes."71
Jeffrey Abramson has cautioned, however, against an overem-
phasis on appearances, cosmetics, and public relations: "This at-
tempt to justify the cross-sectional ideal by reference to its contri-
bution to the appearance rather than the actuality of justice is
disturbing. It makes the purpose of the cross-sectional theory a
tinued-of Juries, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 503, 537 (Robert G. McCloskey ed.,
1967) ("The grand jury are a great channel of communication, between those who make
and administer the laws, and those for whom the laws are made and administered.").
Efforts to determine what communities jurors represent sometimes have provoked
intense dispute. The anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of the Constitution objected
to the jury trial provision of Article III, Section 2, on the ground that it extended vic-
inage too broadly and so permitted defendants to be tried by jurors who were not truly
members of their own communities. The Sixth Amendment responded to the anti-
Federalists' objection by narrowing the vicinage of federal jury trials. See FRANCIS H.
HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 25 (1951). Moreover, as scholars have emphasized in
recent years, communities need not be defined solely in geographic terms. See, e.g., LANr
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTA-
TIVE DEMOCRACY (1994). Current affirmative action proposals are part of a continuing
effort over the centuries to define and redefine the representative role of juries.
70. See, e.g., King, supra note 21, at 762 (declaring "(1) that maximizing the appear-
ance of fairness of criminal jury proceedings is a compelling governmental interest, (2)
that fair racial representation on juries is vital to the appearance of fairness in criminal
jury proceedings, and (3) that in some circumstances race-conscious selection practices
may improve, not impair, this appearance" (footnote omitted)).
71. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992) (footnote omitted).
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nakedly political one, bent on popularizing the verdict ...."'
Even after the disturbances following the Rodney King verdict, it
is more important that justice be done than that it be seen to be
done.73 Nevertheless, public confidence in the legal system re-
mains (other things equal) preferable to the alternative. That the
Hennepin County proposal might make some members of minority
groups less likely to view American criminal justice as an alien
system is among the proposal's virtues. As Andrew Deiss has ob-
served, even Americans whose own view of the videotape evi-
dence initially persuaded them of the guilt of the police officers
who beat Rodney King probably would have seen the officers'
acquittals as just (or at least as acceptable) if these verdicts had
been rendered by an all-African-American jury. One measure of a
jury system's success may be the extent to which it inspires the
members of a diverse community to say of verdicts that depart
from their predilections, "I guess I was wrong."74
Diverse viewpoints are more important to a jury's perfor-
mance than diverse skin color, but promoting diversity of race and
ethnicity may provide a more workable means of ensuring diverse
viewpoints than attempting to probe viewpoints directly through
questionnaires, voir dire examinations, and the like. The experi-
ences of members of different racial and ethnic groups tend to
differ in ways that may affect their perceptions of some issues that
come before juries.75 Not only would the direct probing of the
72. ABRAMSON, supra note 50, at 125.
73. Compare the too grand, too English, and too often quoted statement of Rex v.
Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259: "[J]ustice should not only be done, but should
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."
74. See Deiss, supra note 43, at 51.
75. See, e.g., Jim Ross, Race Divides Opinions on Bunch Case, Poll Says, ST. PE-
TERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al; Most Blacks Say Too Few Convicted in King
Beating Case, Reuters, Apr. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File
(reporting that twice as high a percentage of African-Americans as of whites consider the
justice system biased). Both of these sources and others suggesting racial differences are
cited in Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confi-
dence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1177, 1192-95 (1994).
The Florida Supreme Court recently ordered an evidentiary hearing in a civil case
in which one member of an all-white jury reported that some of his fellow jurors had
compared a black witness to a chimpanzee, used racial epithets, and joked that the
plaintiffs' children probably were drug dealers. Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 83,625,
1995 Fla. LEXIS 24, at *1-*3 (No. 83,625, Jan. 19, 1995). Even when the presence of
one or more minority-race jurors does not affect the quality of a jury's deliberations, it is
likely to inhibit this sort of dialogue.
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attitudes of prospective jurors be burdensome and invasive of their
privacy, but it also would pose a risk of governmental viewpoint
discrimination. This risk seems insubstantial when jury selection
rests on objective demographic indicators of social experience and
when no group is assured more representation than its share of
the population.
In short, the Hennepin County quotas would present few of
the difficulties that prompt concern about other affirmative action
programs and about racial classifications in general. These quotas
would not deprive individuals of significant tangible benefits; they
would not brand any group as inferior or evaluate any individual
on the basis of racial stereotypes; and far from diverting the grand
jury from its central mission, they would be likely to enhance the
grand jury's achievement of its objectives.
VI. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND RACIAL BALANCE
Ironically, the Supreme Court Justices who appear most likely
to disapprove the Hennepin County proposal have expressed sym-
pathy for a more invidious procedure that they believe may con-
tribute in some circumstances to racially balanced juries. In Geor-
gia v. McCollum,76 the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
forbids defense attorneys as well as prosecutors from exercising
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective African-American
jurors on the basis of race.' An amicus curiae brief submitted by
the NAACP in support of the McCollum ruling suggested that the
use of peremptory challenges by minority defendants to exclude
prospective white jurors should be treated differently. The brief
declared, "The only possible chance the defendant may have of
having any minority jurors on the jury that actually tries him will
be if he uses his peremptories to strike members of the majority
race."'78 Justice O'Connor, dissenting in McCollum, quoted this
language with approval.79 Justice Thomas, concurring in McCol-
lum only on the ground that precedent compelled the Court's
result, declared, "I am certain that black criminal defendants will
76. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
77. Id. at 2359.
78. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at
9-10, McCollum v. Georgia, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (No. 91-372).
79. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2364 (O'Connnor, J., dissenting).
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rue the day that this court ventured down th[e] road" of using the
Constitution to restrict peremptory challenges.'
An unrestricted regime of peremptory challenges of the sort
apparently favored by Justice Thomas and other Supreme Court
Justices8' is far more likely to produce all-white juries and other
forms of racial imbalance than a regime in which discrimination in
the exercise of peremptory challenges is forbidden. One need not
be a great mathematician to recognize that when both sides have
an equal number of challenges,' an advocate seeking the exclu-
sion of a minority group is more likely to achieve her objective
than an advocate seeking the exclusion of the majority.'
Even the asymmetrical regime of challenges favored by the
NAACP, permitting defendants to challenge prospective jurors on
racial grounds only when the jurors are white, would produce
racial balance only by happenstance and only on the basis of a
partisan attorney's stereotypical judgment about the members of a
racial group. A defense attorney representing an African-American
defendant who challenges white jurors on the basis of race has
concluded (perhaps accurately) that minority-group jurors are
more likely than whites to favor her client's position. This advo-
cate does not seek diversity, balance, more effective group deliber-
ation, greater public confidence in the fairness of the justice sys-
tem, or any other public good. Her goal, like that of every other
advocate, is victory for her client. Although this advocate might be
unlikely to secure the presence of more than two or three minori-
ty-group members on a twelve-person jury, she probably would if
she could. Indeed, if luck permitted her to eliminate all pro-
spective white jurors, she probably would consider this racial ban-
ishment a victory.'
80. Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2095 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Both sides have peremptory
challenges, and they are sometimes used to assure rather than to prevent a racially di-
verse jury.").
81. See J.E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1436 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
137 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. Only 15 of 51 American jurisdictions afford defendants more peremptory chal-
lenges than prosecutors in noncapital felony cases, and only seven provide more challeng-
es to defendants in misdemeanor cases. JON VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES
282-84 (1977).
83. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515-16 (Mass. 1979) (noting that
unrestricted peremptory challenges produce "a jury in which the subtle group biases of
the majority are permitted to operate, while those of the minority have been silenced").
84. The Supreme Court has rejected the views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justic-
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The Hennepin County plan does not depend on the uncertain
outcome of partisan race wars (or race games) in the courtroom,
and it does not rest on any judgment about how the members of
racial groups are likely to vote in particular cases.' Unlike the
strategies of partisans, this plan is designed to promote the public
objectives of more effective grand jury deliberation and enhanced
public confidence in grand jury rulings. The Hennepin County pro-
posal rests on only one group judgment-that the members of
racial minorities are likely to have (or sometimes may have, or
may reasonably be seen by the public as having) distinctive experi-
ences and perspectives that can improve a grand jury's perfor-
mance. If the Supreme Court Justices who have defended the
racially based exercise of peremptory challenges by either defense
attorneys or prosecutors were to condemn the Hennepin County
proposal as discriminatory, they surely would have things topsy-
turvy. Peremptory challenges can convey to excluded jurors the
messages that Hennepin County's quotas do not-that someone (a
lawyer or perhaps a judge"6) disfavors the jurors' racial or ethnic
groups, that this person has judged the jurors not capable or trust-
es Thomas, Scalia, and O'Connor and has forbidden both prosecutors and defense attor-
neys from exercising peremptory challenges on racial grounds. Georgia v. McCollum, 112
S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Until courts or legislatures abolish the
peremptory challenge, however, the ban on racial discrimination will remain reasonably
easy to evade. See Alschuler, supra note 61, at 170-79. One virtue of racial quotas is
that they reduce the incentive of lawyers to engage in racial discrimination whenever the
elimination of a minority juror would bring the number of minority jurors below the
required minimum. Discrimination in this situation would merely lead to the replacement
of one minority juror by another.
85. The proposal does rest on the perception that the members of racial minorities
are likely to have distinctive perspectives, and of course these perspectives may lead
minority group members to vote differently from whites. The proposal does not, however,
rest on any prediction of the direction or magnitude of racial differences in voting pat-
terns, let alone on any prediction of racial differences in particular cases. The general
sense of racial difference that informs the proposal bears little resemblance to the crude
racial judgments that are likely to inform the exercise of peremptory challenges.
86. Peremptory challenges often are not exercised openly in the courtroom. After
opposing lawyers have told a judge which prospective jurors they wish to strike, the
judge simply informs these jurors that they have been excused. See CATHY E. BENNETT
& ROBERT B. HIRSCHHORN, BENNETT'S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION AND TRIAL DY-
NAMICS § 17.21 (1993); JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION:
THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY 329 (2d ed. 1990). Cf. Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (1992) ("Regardless of who precipitated the jurors'
removal, the perception and the reality . will be that the court has excused jurors
based on race . . ").
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worthy enough to serve, and that the jurors have been evaluated
on the basis of crude group stereotypes.
Rulings on the use of peremptory challenges and other jury
qualification issues sometimes give judges a sub rosa opportunity
to engage in color-conscious jury selection, and their efforts to
achieve racial balance may prove more costly than openly ac-
knowledged forms of affirmative action. In the second trial of the
police officers accused of beating Rodney King (the federal court
trial), Judge John G. Davies refused to permit the defendants to
challenge peremptorily an African-American who had failed to
disclose that he lived in South Central Los Angeles, near the
center of the rioting that had followed the first King verdict. The
defendants' lawyers feared that this prospective juror had omitted
the information deliberately in an effort to make his way onto the
jury and to remedy the perceived injustice of the first King ver-
dict. Although Judge Davies ruled that the lawyers lacked a racial-
ly neutral reason for their challenge, he might have had another
reason for retaining the challenged juror. As George Fletcher not-
ed, "[N]o one--:not the defense, not the prosecution, not the
judge-dared to go to trial without fair 'community' representation
on the jury."'
A more striking illustration of the dangers of sub rosa affir-
mative action came in the case of Timothy L. Baugh, an African-
American charged with fourteen rapes in Hennepin County. After
one of the two African-Americans on the panel of prospective
87. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 54-55 (1995). Even in a federal district with a large minority population, color-
blind jury selection might have yielded an all-white jury; the jury that Judge Davies
impaneled included only two African-Americans and one Latino. See supra note 16. One
wonders how many Americans who profess support for a color-blind Constitution would
have been unperturbed by the selection of an all-white jury in the second King trial.
Prosecutors in the case of OJ. Simpson could have set the case for trial in the
area of Los Angeles County where the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron
Goldman occurred, but these prosecutors evidently preferred a trial in downtown Los
Angeles, where the likelihood that the jury would include African-Americans was greater.
Randall Sullivan, Unreasonable Doubt (pt. 2), ROLLING STONE, Dec. 29, 1994, at 130,
149. Public opinion polls indicated that African-Americans were much less likely than
whites to favor the prosecutors' position, id. at 144, but apparently no one (not the elect-
ed Los Angeles County District Attorney, in any event) wished to run the risk of an
overwhelmingly white jury in a racially sensitive case. On July 19, 1994, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney met with 15 African-American leaders who expressed concern
that Simpson would not receive a fair trial and who urged the district attorney not to
seek the death penalty. Id. at 143.
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jurors revealed that she knew three of the defendant's prospective
alibi witnesses, Judge Robert Lynn permitted prosecutors to chal-
lenge this juror peremptorily.'
The one African-American still on the panel sometimes an-
swered questions in ways that were difficult to follow. When, for
example, this juror was asked why he had checked both yes and
no to the question, "Under our system of justice a defendant is
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you
agree with that principle?," he replied in part, "You can't really
go on facts that much because that's one of the reasons I got
stabbed because she was being-okay, that facts was I done it, but
I didn't do nothing and come to find out I didn't do nothing. The
facts not always right." 9 Asked once more to explain, the juror
said, "Let's see, okay, like I did a couple crimes, but then, okay, I
did some of them and-I did most of them, I did do some of
them and I didn't do some and half of the times, you know, the
facts are there, but it's not there."'
Other statements were more clear, however. For example,
when the juror was asked, "What do you think of the criminal
justice system?," he replied, "It sucks."'" And when a prosecutor
asked how severely one of the juror's friends had been injured
during an assault, he said,
A Not too bad, she just, you know, just basically sex
though.
Q It was sex?
A Yeah.
Q So this was kind of a rape situation sort of?
A Yeah.92
Judge Lynn refused to dismiss the prospective juror for cause
and also refused to allow a peremptory challenge by the prosecu-
tor. Perhaps the judge doubted that Minneapolis prosecutors would
have challenged a white juror who voiced the same views of rape
and of the criminal justice system as this African-American juror.
88. State v. Baugh, SIP No. 93027320, CA No. 93-1304, Partial Transcript (Motions)
at 26-27 (Hennepin County, Minn., Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 1994).
89. State v. Baugh, SIP No. 93027320, CA No. 93-1304, Partial Transcript (Juror
Greg Davis) at 7 (Hennepin County, Minn., Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 1994).
90. Id. at 41.
91. Id. at 34.
92. Id. at 60.
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More probably, however, the judge accepted an extralegal argu-
ment against exclusion advanced by the defense attorney. Al-
though the Constitution prohibited this lawyer from taking race
into account in exercising his own peremptory challenges,93 he
apparently saw no need to preserve the pretense of color-blindness
while arguing about his opponent's challenges: "This is our last
chance. We don't have any more opportunities to have a black
person on this jury .... I ask this Court to let this juror stand."'94
Following selection of the challenged juror, a Minneapolis
television station broadcast his mug shot. (Seven months earlier,
the juror had been arrested for aggravated robbery. He had, how-
ever, been released without the filing of a formal charge.) The
juror then told the court, "I cannot go on the jury."'95 Six other
jurors reported that they had learned about the broadcast, all of
them by disregarding the judge's instructions not to watch televi-
sion. Judge Lynn then dismissed the jury and began jury selection
anew.
96
A racial quota would have permitted Judge Lynn to evaluate
the prosecutor's challenge on its merits without concern that per-
mitting the challenge would have yielded an all-white jury. Such a
quota could have assured the judge that dismissal of the chal-
lenged juror would have led only to the replacement of this mi-
nority juror with another.
VII. QUOTAS AND FEDERALISM
Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that the con-
stitutionality of affirmative action programs depends in large mea-
93. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), may not have condemned unam-
biguously the racially based challenge of white prospective jurors, but the Supreme
Court's subsequent ruling that the gender-based challenge of either a woman or a man is
unconstitutional leaves little room for distinguishing one racially grounded challenge from
another. See J.E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994).
94. State v. Baugh, SIP No. 93027320, CA No. 93-1304, Partial Transcript (Juror
Greg Davis) at 69 (Hennepin County, Minn., Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 1994).
95. Mike Sweeney, Pretrial Publicity Spurs Dismissal of Baugh Jury, ST. PAUL PIO-
NEER PRESS, Oct. 4, 1994, at 1A. Among the many people who had approached the
juror following the news broadcast was a stranger who said, "I know you're going to
hang him, right?" Id.
96. See Doug Grow, Judge's Reasoning in Baugh Case Isn't New: Blame Media, MIN-
NEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 4, 1994, at B3; Sweeney, supra note 95, at 1A; Margaret
Zack, Judge Dismisses Whole Jury for Rape Trial, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 4,
1994, at Al.
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sure on whether they were approved by Congress or by state or
local legislative bodies. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,9' the
Supreme Court considered federal legislation and said that encour-
aging diverse radio and television programming was an appropriate
governmental objective.98 The Court held, moreover, that promot-
ing the minority ownership of radio and television stations was an
appropriate means of furthering this legitimate goal of diversity.99
The case for employing color-conscious measures to promote the
expression of diverse perspectives in the jury room seems at least
as compelling as the case for employing color-conscious measures
in the allocation of broadcast licenses. Promoting the sound admin-
istration of justice seems fully as important as promoting a choice
of music and talk shows. Metro Broadcasting, however, is not on
point in evaluating the constitutionality of the Hennepin County
proposal for one reason: in judging affirmative action efforts, the
Supreme Court has turned ordinary concepts of federalism on
their head."°
In Justice Brandeis's classic language, "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try."' ' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has afforded the federal
government more freedom to experiment in the creation of affir-
mative action programs than local governments, subjecting only the
efforts of local governments to "strict scrutiny."
In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,"2 the Court attempted to
justify this hpproach by emphasizing Congress's power under Sec-
97. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
98. Id. at 567.
99. Id. at 567-68; see also wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[A]ithough its pre-
cise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been
found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to support the
use of racial considerations in furthering that interest.").
100. In addition, the Supreme Court maintained that Metro Broadcasting concerned
the constitutionality of a racial "preference" rather than a racial quota. Metro Broadcast-
ing, 497 U.S. at 599. Among the policies that the Court upheld in Metro Broadcasting,
however, was one that limited all "distress sales" of broadcast facilities to minority-con-
trolled enterprises-a requirement that might have been characterized as a 100% quota.
Id. at 598-99.
101. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
102. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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tion V of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that Amend-
ment. 3 How an affirmative action program that would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment when approved by a state legislature
could become an appropriate means of enforcing the Amendment
when approved by Congress was, however, a mystery.' 4 Later, in
Metro Broadcasting, the Court exempted the federal government's
race-conscious allocation of broadcast licenses from strict scrutiny
despite the fact that Congress's powers under Section V of the
Fourteenth Amendment plainly had no bearing on the issue. °"
Talk of federalism in Croson and Metro Broadcasting may have
been designed primarily to alibi the Supreme Court's vacillation on
affirmative action issues.0
In 1947, an opinion for the Court by Justice Jackson took a
different view from the one expressed in recent cases:
We ... will not use [the Fourteenth] Amendment to standardize
administration of justice and stagnate local variations in practice.
The jury system is one which has undergone great modifications
in its long history and it is still undergoing revision and adap-
tation to adjust it to the tensions of time and locality .... The
states have had different and constantly changing tests of eligi-
bility for service. Evolution of the jury continues even now, and
many experiments are under way that were strange to the com-
mon law .... Well has it been said of our power to limit state
action that "To stay experimentation in things social and eco-
nomic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment
may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation."1"
At a time when the jury and other democratic institutions may be
faltering and when racial mistrust runs high, Justice Jackson's
warning of the danger of restricting the remedial efforts of local
governments seems especially apropos.
103. Id. at 486-96.
104. See id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
105. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990); see also Croson,
488 U.S. at 522-24 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (offering a Madisonian justifi-
cation for inverting the view of federalism expressed by James Madison in THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 45, at 313 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
106. See Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1436, 1437 (1987) (suggesting that such wavering has been characteristic
of the Court's approach to many constitutional issues of our time).
107. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 295-96 (1947) (quoting New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 44:704
RACIAL QUOTAS
VIII. SOME QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS0 8
A. Racial Matching
Shari Lynn Johnson has proposed that every African-Ameri-
can, Native American, or Hispanic-American defendant be entitled
to the inclusion of three "racially similar" jurors on a jury of
twelve. " The Hennepin County proposal, however, does not at-
tempt to match the races of jurors and defendants, and contrary to
common assumptions, its principal objective is not to assure every
minority defendant a jury of his "peers.""'
The presence of minority-race jurors may be especially impor-
tant when minority-race defendants are on trial, but the value of
inclusive jury selection procedures is not limited to the cases of
these defendants. The discussion of verdicts by all-white juries with
which this Article began mentioned only one prosecution in which
the defendants were members of a racial minority, that of the
Scottsboro boys. Most of these troublesome verdicts came in cases
in which the defendants were white. In recent years, cases in
which white law enforcement officers have been accused of mis-
treating minority suspects have been a special source of concern.
White jurors may tend to view the victimization of nonwhites as
less serious than the victimization of members of their own racial
group. This danger seems fully as strong as the danger that white
jurors will be biased against minority defendants."' Indeed, ver-
108. When I presented an early version of this paper to the Center for the New
American Community of the Manhattan Institute, questions focused on a hypothetical
African-American tourist from Massachusetts arrested and charged with a crime in Mon-
tana, a state with no significant African-American population. Could an all-white Montana
jury give this defendant a fair trial? If so, couldn't an all-white jury in Massachusetts af-
ford the defendant a fair trial as well? Would the inclusion of Native Americans from
Montana on this African-American defendant's jury assure him a fair trial? If African-
Americans truly have distinct perspectives that ought to be heard, shouldn't Montana bus
in African-American jurors from somewhere else? This Part considers the constitutional
issues suggested by these questions and a few other issues as well.
109. Shari L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611,
1698-99 (1985). Compare Colbert, supra note 51, at 124 ("[A] race neutral verdict is
achieved when at least three black jurors are selected to judge a criminal or civil case
that involves the rights of a black person.").
110. See infra note 132.
111. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 185 (1990) (revealing that the killers of white victims
are more likely to be sentenced to death than the killers of nonwhite victims and that
the race of the victim affects the likelihood of capital punishment more than the race of
the defendant); William C. Heffernan, The Majoritarian Threat Posed by the Jury, 25
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dicts by all-white juries sometimes have been problematic even
when both the defendant and his asserted victim were white; con-
sider cases in which white jurors tolerated violence against white
Republicans following the Civil War and against white civil rights
workers a century later.
Moreover, the inclusion of minority jurors can make juries
fairer and more effective in cases that do not present racially
sensitive issues. Justice Marshall wrote for the Supreme Court in
Peters v. Kiffi.
[W]e are unwilling to make the assumption that the exclusion of
Negroes has relevance only for issues involving race. When any
large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from
jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities
of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of
which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to
assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class
in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives thejury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspect-
112ed importance in any case ....
Affirmative action in jury selection has value in cases other
than those with minority defendants. Moreover, efforts to match
jurors and defendants by race and ethnicity could prove difficult
and unbecoming. These efforts would require courts to confront
such questions as whether Mexican-Americans are sufficiently
similar in background and culture to Puerto Ricans to merit affir-
CRIM. L. BULL. 79, 80-82 (1989) (emphasizing that the tyranny of the majority can infect
jury trials just as it does other democratic institutions and that the risk of this tyranny is
as great for unpopular victims and those who identify with them as it is for criminal
defendants).
Jeffrey Abramson has summarized some findings of the University of Chicago Jury
Project of the 1950s:
In regard to black defendants, the study suggested two conclusions about jury
verdicts. First, all-white juries had trouble taking seriously violence within the
black community, especially within the black family. They treated black defen-
dants in such cases as parents treat children, dismissing their crimes as "what
one expects from a Negro." Second, all-white juries reacted with severity to
black defendants charged with violence against whites, convicting them in dis-
proportionate numbers.
ABRAMSON, supra note 50, at 110 (discussing Dale W. Broeder, The Negro in Court,
1965 DUKE L.J. 19) (footnotes omitted).
112. 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972); cf. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94
(1946) ("The truth is that [men and women] are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both .... [A] flavor, a
distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.").
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mative inclusion on the juries of Puerto Rican defendants, whether
Filipino-Americans are sufficiently similar in race and ethnicity to
warrant their affirmative inclusion on the juries of Japanese-Amer-
ican defendants, and whether any prospective jurors are racially or
ethnically similar to a defendant whose grandparents are African-
American, Hispanic-American, Asian-American, and Native Ameri-
can."' As the United States grows more multiracial and
multicultural,"' troublesome issues of racial matching could arise
more frequently.
B. Racial Grouping
Affirmative action in jury selection does not require the racial
matching of jurors and defendants. It does, however, require speci-
fication of the appropriate group for distinctive treatment. In seek-
ing an end to all-white grand juries, the Hennepin County propos-
al treats "minority persons" as the relevant group.' This choice
might appear problematic in some situations-for example, one in
which two Asian-Americans but no African-Americans have been
selected to serve on a grand jury considering the alleged abuse of
African-Americans by the police.
Few members of racial and ethnic minorities consider them-
selves part of an undifferentiated "minority group.""' 6 The first
Rodney King jury included two "minority persons" (a Latino and
an Asian-American)," 7 but the inclusion of these jurors did not
forestall the rioting, anger, and recrimination that followed the
jury's verdict. Indeed, the inclusion of these minority jurors did
not prevent some journalists from describing the jury as all-
white."'
113. See Alschuler, supra note 61, at 191-92.
114. The number of children living in families in which one parent is white and the
other is African-American, Asian-American, or Native American has tripled since 1970.
See Deborah A. Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White
Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990
DATA ON INTERRACIAL HOUSEHOLDS (1994)); see also Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note,
Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification in America and Its Implications for
Transracial Adoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1994).
115. HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 27.
116. See Johnson, supra note 109, at 1698 (citing empirical data "which show[] that
minority group members replicate the majority's view of all racial minorities except their
own").
117. See Jacqueline Soteropoulos, With Juries, Appearances Matter; Experts Say Mi-
nority Representation Low, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 5, 1994, Florida Metro Section, at 1.
118. See, e~g., All-White Jury to Hear Trial of Police in Beating Case, ORLANDO SEN-
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The appropriateness of grouping minority persons together
may depend partly on the extent to which the members of racial
and ethnic minorities sense commonalities with one another and
on the extent to which other audiences perceive these commonali-
ties as well. Appropriate grouping may depend more fundamental-
ly, however, on the demographics of particular jurisdictions.
Suppose, for example, that the expected number of African-
Americans on a randomly selected jury in Lake Wobegon County,
rounded to the nearest whole number, is none. Suppose that the
expected number of Hispanic-Americans also is none, that the
expected number of Native Americans is none, and that the ex-
pected number of Asian-Americans is none. Suppose, however,
that if the members of these four racial and ethnic groups were
joined together, the expected number of "minority persons" on
each jury would be one or, with only slight upward rounding, two.
Providing for the inclusion of one or two "minority persons" on
every jury in Lake Wobegon County would ensure some minority
representation in every case while, in effect, using random meth-
ods to determine which groups would be represented in particular
cases. Specification of the appropriate group for distinctive treat-
ment may vary with the racial and ethnic characteristics and the
social experiences of particular jurisdictions, and officials who
understand local conditions seem best suited to draw the necessary
lines.
C. Nonracial Groups
In 1979, Douglas R. Schmidt, an attorney for Dan White,
succeeded in keeping homosexual men and women off the jury
that tried White for murdering George Moscone, the mayor of San
Francisco, and Harvey Milk, a San Francisco supervisor and prom-
inent gay activist." 9 The jury accepted White's partial defense of
diminished capacity (often called "the Twinkie defense" because a
defense expert testified that junk food was one of the influences
TINEL TRIB., Mar. 3, 1992, at A15; Herb Caen, Monday Short Line, S.F. CHRON., May 4,
1992, at B1; Lou Cannon, L.A. Police Dept.: 'Dragnet' It Isn't, WASH. POST, Mar. 29,
1992, at A3; Jorge Casuso, Video of L.A. Beating Shown As Trial Begins, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 6, 1992, at A4; Michael Prowse, Wounds Run Deep: America's Racial Tensions Are
at Snapping Point, FIN. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at 9.
119. See FLETCHER, supra note 87, at 34 ("Since the candidates for the jury had to
declare their marital status, it was not too difficult to ferret out probable gays .. .
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that had deprived White of the capacity to act with malice). The
Dan White verdict brought to the streets 5,000 gay men who
marched on city hall, smashed windows, and overturned and
burned eight police cars.'
In 1991, William Kunstler sought a "third world jury of non-
whites, or anyone who's been pushed down by white society,"''
to try EI-Sayyid Nosair for killing Meir Kahane, the founder of
the Jewish Defense League and an Israeli ultranationalist. The jury
that acquitted Nosair of killing Kahane included no Jews," and
the judge who presided at the trial declared that its verdict was
"against the overwhelming evidence and ... devoid of common
sense and logic."" Jews in both New York and Israel took to
the streets to protest this verdict.2 4
One year later (during the same year as the first Rodney
King verdict), a Brooklyn jury with no Jewish members"25 acquit-
ted Lemrick Nelson, Jr. of killing Yankel Rosenbaum during a
violent encounter between African-Americans and Jews . 6 Ro-
senbaum had identified Nelson, an African-American teenager, as
his attacker, and the murder weapon had been found in Nelson's
possession. Thousands of Hasidic Jews gathered in protest.
As these cases reveal, the members of nonracial groups may
feel aggrieved when no members of their groups sit on the juries
that resolve cases drawing their strong interest and concern. Nev-
ertheless, in a reasonably small body like a jury, ensuring propor-
tional representation by race, gender, sexual orientation, handicap,
religion, nationality, wealth, and age would be impossible. The
Hennepin County Attorney, Michael 0. Freeman (who appointed
the Hennepin County Task Force and who strongly supports its
proposals), reports that he personally would draw the line at race
and accept any political consequences that follow.
This line seems appropriate. No other group in America can
recite a history of mistreatment by juries comparable to the mis-
120. Id. at 1, 15, 260.
121. ABRAMSON, supra note 50, at 145.
122. See FLETCHER, supra note 87, at 75-79.
123. Id. at 85.
124. Id.
125. Jews constitute 16% of the Brooklyn population and about 20% of the popula-
tion eligible for jury service. Id. at 92.
126. Id. at 103.
127. See ABRAMSON, supra note 50, at 103; FLETCHER, supra note 87, at 90, 103.
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treatment of African-Americans that the opening section of this
Article chronicled in part. One hundred fifteen years ago, in
Strauder v. West Virginia,128 the Supreme Court recognized the
distinctiveness of this mistreatment. Noting the prejudice with
which whites regarded African-Americans," 9 the Court held that
the exclusion of African-Americans from jury service violated the
right of African-American litigants to equal protection of the laws.
At the same time, the Supreme Court declared that the exclusion
of members of nonracial groups from jury service (women, for
example) did not violate the equal protection rights of litigants
who belonged to these groups.13 The Court considered racial
discrimination sui generis"' In places other than Hennepin
County, different histories, different demographics, and different
social issues might prompt the affirmative inclusion of members of
some nonracial groups on juries. Once more, the difficult task of
grouping and line-drawing seems best left to state and local gov-
ernments.
D. Representation or Diversity
The Hennepin County proposal might enhance the sense of
minority-group members and others that minorities are represented
in jury proceedings. It also might promote the expression of di-
verse viewpoints in the jury room and enhance the quality of jury
deliberations. Although the proposal furthers both objectives and
forces no choice between them, the two goals are not identical.
128. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
129. Id. at 309-10.
130. Id. at 310 ("[A state] may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to citi-
zens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifications. We
do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this."); see
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding unanimously that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not extend the vote to women).
131. Although the Supreme Court has not required any sort of proportional repre-
sentation on juries as a matter of constitutional law, it has said that the case for the pro-
portional representation of African-Americans is stronger than the case for the propor-
tional representation of groups defined only by their economic circumstances. See Fay v.
New York, 332 U.S. 261, 291 (1947).
132. A third objective of the Hennepin County proposal might be more fully assuring
minority defendants that they will be tried by "juries of their peers" through the inclu-
sion of racially and ethnically similar jurors. This objective might conflict with either of
the others, but promoting greater identity between defendants and jurors at the cost of
representation of the community is not likely. Few, for example, would deliberately in-
clude either a disproportionate share of high school dropouts on the juries that try high
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The claim that jurors serve in a representative capacity seems
in one sense uncontroversial. When community moral judgments
are too varied and complex to be translated into precise rules,
legislatures may delegate to juries the task of ensuring that crimi-
nal judgments accord with the community's sense of justice. The
Supreme Court has said for more than fifty years, "[T]he proper
functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself,
requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the com-
munity.""" The Court's most recent opinion on jury selection
reiterated this theme: "The diverse and representative character of
the jury must be maintained. . . ."" Although American juries
now lack the formal power to resolve questions of law that many
American juries once possessed, 35 vague standards of substantive
criminal law (for example, in cases presenting questions of homi-
cide, fraud, obscenity, causation, self-defense, and necessity) invite
and require the exercise of a de facto lawmaking power. The exer-
cise of this power seems appropriate only if juries in some sense
represent their communities. Moreover, juries authorized to deter-
mine the length of prison sentences (in a few states) and to decide
whether to impose the death penalty (in many) plainly have been
afforded their awesome powers on the assumption that they repre-
sent their communities.
In another sense, however, the claim that jurors serve in a
representative capacity seems troublesome: no individual juror
should be expected to represent anyone other than herself. If
Hennepin County's jury selection methods encouraged minority-
race jurors to view themselves not simply as independent citizens,
but as representatives of a race or a people, that effect would be
school dropouts or a disproportionate share of Ph.D.'s on the juries that try Ph.D.'s.
When the goal of including jurors whom defendants are likely to recognize as their peers
conflicts with the goal of representing the community, community representation is likely
to prevail. Again, however, the Hennepin County proposal does not carry any of the
possible justifications for affirmative action in jury selection to the point that it conflicts
with any of the others.
133. Glasser v.. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940)); see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 237 (1978); Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
134. J.E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1424 (1994). But see Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474, 480 (1990) (declaring that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury, not a
representative one).
135. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 902-21 (1994).
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regrettable.136 The proposition that jurors both represent others
and act independently may seem contradictory, but perhaps the
contradiction can be resolved if juries but not jurors act as com-
munity representatives. The selection of a sufficiently large body of
jurors through sufficiently inclusive means may permit every juror
to vote her conscience while still providing some assurance that
the jury's collective judgment accords with general community
sentiments.137 The Hennepin County proposal reflects the same
ambivalence concerning representation that characterizes most
136. Jeffrey Abramson, an opponent of the use of racial quotas in jury selection, has
written that the issue turns primarily on whether one views juries as "deliberative" or
"representative." See ABRAMSON, supra note 50, at 8. Abramson has said, "The ideal of
the cross-sectional jury rejects th[e] common-law view of impartial deliberation. It sees
individual jurors as inevitably the bearers of the diverse perspectives and interests of
their race, religion, gender, and ethnic background." Id. at 100-01. In Abramson's view,
"The new purpose of the cross-section becomes to give voice or representation to com-
peting group loyalties, almost as if a juror had been sent by constituents to vote their
preferred verdict." Id. at 102. He observes, "Surely the jury has not survived all these
centuries only to teach us that democracy is about brokering justice among irreconcilably
antagonistic groups." Id. at 8; see also id. at 245-47.
The vision that informs the Hennepin County proposal, however, is not one of
selfish interest-group politics. Such a vision, extended to the jury room, might yield only
hung juries and compromise verdicts. Instead, the vision of politics that the Hennepin
County Task Force hoped to implement more fully in the jury room is one that has
been described by Robert Hughes:
The social richness of America, so striking to the foreigner, comes from the di-
versity of its tribes. Its capacity for cohesion, for some spirit of common
agreement on what is to be done, comes from the willingness of those tribes
not to elevate their cultural differences into impassable barriers and ramparts,
not to fetishize their "African-ness" or Italianitd, which make them distinct, at
the expense of their Americanness, which gives them a vast common ground.
ROBERT HUGHES, CULTURE OF COMPLAINT. THE FRAYING OF AMERICA 20 (1993). As
Abramson notes, "[J]urors cross demographic boundaries to reach unanimous verdicts in
cases every day." ABRAMSON, supra note 50, at 104. Abramson's two models of the jury
do not seem incompatible; juries can be both deliberative and representative. Indeed, the
principal reason for making juries more representative is to improve the quality of their
deliberations. But see infra text accompanying note 141 (arguing that affirmative action
measures must be bounded by concepts of proportional representation even when they
are designed primarily to improve the quality of jury deliberations).
137. James Madison suggested that elected officials should seek to advance the welfare
of the community rather than to promote the views of their own constituents. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60-61 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). This position echoed that of
Edmund Burke, who maintained that legislators should regard themselves as trustees
rather than as delegates-that is, as people trusted by the electorate to exercise indepen-
dent judgment rather than as people chosen to implement the electorate's own legislative
goals. See EDMUND BURKE, BURKE'S PoLCs 28 (Ross Hoffman & Paul Levack eds.,
1949); HANNAH PIaIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 171-72 (1967). Jurors
certainly should sense no greater obligation to act as representatives than legislators and
other elected officials do. They probably should sense substantially less.
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views of the jury; it is not intended to compromise or restrict the
independence of jurors.
Adding diverse perspectives to the jury room could in some
circumstances conflict with the goal of promoting effective repre-
sentation of the community. If, for example, a rural county with a
tiny minority population were to include one or two minority-
group members on every jury (perhaps even importing some of
these jurors from an urban neighborhood outside the county), this
measure might enhance the expression of distinctive viewpoints
while making juries less representative of the county's popula-
tion.138
The extent to which governments can legitimately sacrifice
representation to enhance the quality of jury deliberations is un-
clear.139 For example, in an effort to improve the performance of
juries, a state might mandate the affirmative inclusion of some ju-
rors on nonracial bases. This state might require that every jury
include one college graduate, that every jury impaneled to hear a
tax prosecution include two accountants, that half of the jurors
hearing a medical malpractice case be members of the medical
profession, that a jury hearing a mercantile dispute be composed
mostly of merchants, and that every jury include a licensed mem-
ber of the bar. Some of this state's mandatory inclusions might be
constitutional, while others might seem inconsistent with a concept
of jury trial that state and federal constitutions should pre-
serve.
14
138. The likelihood that any political agency would in fact vote to make juries less
representative in order to enhance diversity seems exceedingly small.
139. Compare cases cited supra note 68 with Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
223-25 (1946) (using the Supreme Court's supervisory power to strike down an exclusion
of daily wage earners from jury service and declaring that the Court would not "breathe
life into any latent tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of the economically
and socially privileged").
140. Common law courts sometimes impaneled juries of experts, which "ranged from
panels of cooks and fishmongers to the all-female jury panel impaneled to ascertain
whether a female defendant was pregnant." Oldham, supra note 48, at 139; see also 1
JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 93-99 (1992) (describing Lord Chief Justice Mansfield's
use of merchant juries in commercial cases). Even apart from the use of "special" juries,
property qualifications and other devices were intended to make common law juries more
"qualified" than "representative." See Oldham, supra note 48, at 140-64. But see Thiel,
328 U.S. at 223-24 (declaring that democratic nature of jury system makes wealth irrele-
vant to qualification for jury service).
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One danger posed by the nonrandom inclusion on juries of
people with special qualifications is that of ideological jury-stack-
ing. This danger seems most pronounced when the likelihood of
distinctive viewpoints is itself considered a qualification for service
and when officials may guarantee some favored groups greater-
than-proportional representation. The Constitution probably should
limit the government's ability to place its thumb on the scales in
the marketplace of ideas established in most jury deliberations.141
Even if diversity rather than representation is the principal objec-
tive of the Hennepin County proposal, proportionality may remain
an essential constraint.
The principal purpose of the Hennepin County proposal is not
to enhance any group's aggregate voting power. It is to guarantee
that minority voices will be heard in every case rather than loudly
in one, softly in another, and not at all in a third depending on
the luck of a random draw. Nevertheless, the appropriate baseline
for judging proportional representation is probably the percentage
of minority-group members in the adult population rather than the
proportion of minority-group members who have served on a
county's juries in the past." Within the limits of proportionality
set by this baseline, the Hennepin County proposal could increase
the number of minorities on grand juries. Hennepin County has,
141. But see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986) (declaring that "an im-
partial jury consists of nothing more than 'jurors who will conscientiously apply the law
and find the facts,'" so that the exclusion of all Republicans might be permissible if the
Democrats and Libertarians who remained on a jury were fair-minded people who would
conscientiously apply the law to the facts).
142. The underrepresentation of minorities on juries seems at least partly attributable
to circumstances for which the government may bear responsibility-for example, the
government's inability to deliver jury summonses and questionnaires to minority-group
members at the same rate as to whites. In light of its responsibility for part of the
underrepresentation of minorities, Hennepin County's decision to treat adult population
figures as the relevant baseline for judging proportionality seems at least constitutionally
permissible. HENNEPIN COUNTY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 27. Other baselines
would be more problematic; a county might, for example, provide that the proportion of
minority-group members on its grand juries should approximate the proportion of minori-
ty-group suspects or victims in the cases that grand juries consider.
In voting rights cases, the Supreme Court generally has referred to adult population
figures in assessing whether minorities have been over- or underrepresented. See, e.g.,
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 38-39 (1986). In Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct.
2647, 2662 n.18 (1994), the Court declined to decide whether the appropriate baseline for
judging the representation of Latinos in Florida was the percentage of Latinos in the
state's entire population, in the state's population of adult residents, or in the state's
population of adult citizens. The Court did not mention the percentage of Latinos in the
state's population of registered (or actual) voters as a possible baseline.
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however, bounded diversity with a fair and sensible principle of
proportionality.
IX. THE DOWNSIDE
The preceding Part considered some possibly troublesome
aspects of Hennepin County's proposed methods of jury selection.
The principal objection to these color-conscious methods, however,
is simply that they are color-conscious. A program grounded on
the perception that the members of different races have different
viewpoints may make it more likely that racially distinctive view-
points will persist. This program may encourage people to view
themselves and others in racial terms.143
For the most part, the Hennepin County proposal competes,
not with tangible opposing interests, but with an ideal of color-
blindness.'" And the Supreme Court's decisions on the impor-
tance of color-blindness have vacillated. 4 ' In cases named
Bakke,146  Stotts, 47  Wygant,148  Croson,'149  and Shaw v. Re-
no,5 ° the Court has struck down color-conscious affirmative ac-
tion measures under either the Equal Protection Clause or Title
VII. In cases named Green,' Swann,5 2  Barresi,53  Carey,15 4
143. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct.
2816, 2832 (1993):
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our soci-
ety.... Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us
into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of
a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to as-
pire.
144. Without endorsing an ideal of color-blindness, however, one might object to ra-
cial quotas simply on the ground that they make race-one characteristic among
many-too important. Deborah Ramirez has made this point eloquently: "I am Latino.
But I am also a mother, lawyer, teacher, wife. I don't like being reduced to one aspect
of myself." Letter to author from Deborah A. Ramirez (Aug. 19, 1994) (on file with
author).
145. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 ("This Court never has held that race-conscious
state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances.").
146. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
147. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
148. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 478 U.S. 1014 (1986).
149. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
150. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
151. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
152. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
153. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
154. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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Weber,5 ' Fullilove,56 Sheet Metal Workers,'57 International
Ass'n of Firefighters,' Paradise,"9 and Metro Broadcasting,"6
the Court has upheld color-conscious affirmative action measures
or has itself mandated color-conscious remedies for past discrimi-
nation. Nancy King has commented, "[T]he cases give ... the im-
pression that just when the Court gets going . . , it forgets its
destination ....,6
As the judiciary has found itself unable to provide leadership
on the issue, the two other branches of government, usually with
less ambivalence, have concluded that race cannot be disregarded.
President Clinton campaigned for office on a promise to make his
cabinet and the rest of his administration look like America
62
Following his election, the President sought to fulfill his promise
partly by making repeated efforts to ensure that the Attorney
General of the United States would, for the first time, be a wom-
an.63 Clinton's predecessor in the White House, a member of a
different political party, made obvious efforts to ensure continued
African-American representation on the Supreme Court."M Con-
gress has repeatedly approved minority set-asides and preferences,
measures that seem more likely to be the result of troublesome
rent-seeking behavior than jury-selection quotas, which do not
distribute the government's wealth."
155. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
156. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
157. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
158. Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
159. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
160. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
161. King, supra note 21, at 766.
162. See Judy Keen, Clinton to Be Held to Vow of Diversity, USA TODAY, Nov. 13,
1992, at Al.
163. See Ruth Marcus, Clinton Nominates Reno at Justice, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1993,
at Al.
164. See Maureen Dowd, The Supreme Court: Conservative Black Judge, Clarence
Thomas, Is Named to Marshall's Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at Al.
165. See, e.g., Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116
(codified in significant part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6705(e)-6707(j) (1988)) (upheld in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)); Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31 (1987) (upheld in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)); Act of Nov. 14, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-151, 97 Stat. 964, 970
(uncodified foreign aid appropriation); Act of Jan. 6, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 105(0,
96 Stat. 2100 (uncodified highway construction appropriation); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
17 (1988) (authorizing government contracts with employers who implement affirmative
action programs).
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Presidents and other elected officials are not color-blind, and
in that respect they are not very different from the rest of us.16
One wonders how many American universities, colleges, high
schools, research institutes, television talk shows, Y.M.C.A.'s, Rota-
ry Clubs, and church groups conduct forums on racially sensitive
issues (for example, the use of color-conscious methods in jury
selection) without deliberately including one or more minority-
group speakers on their programs. Why do these groups act to
ensure racial and ethnic diversity among their speakers when they
do? The planners of public programs probably do not expect mi-
nority-group participants to speak for racial or ethnic groups rather
than presenting their own carefully considered positions. Neverthe-
less, these planners may sense that the experience of being a
member of a minority group in America is distinctive-a some-
thing and not a nothing. This experience may contribute to what a
speaker has to say, and the participation of people with this expe-
rience may help to keep the rest of us from floating too far out to
sea. What is true of Rotary Club programs in Massachusetts and
Montana is equally true of grand juries in Minnesota, and when
Presidents are elected to office on the basis of promises to make
their administrations look like America, making Hennepin County
grand juries look like Hennepin County seems legitimate and ap-
propriate.
Americans are not color-blind. They cannot be. The Constitu-
tion does not require them to pretend to be. The Constitution
requires only that the government not stigmatize or otherwise
disadvantage people on the basis of race (at least not without a
sufficiently compelling reason for doing so). The jury selection
methods proposed in Hennepin County do not stigmatize or disad-
vantage people on the basis of race, and I believe that they are
constitutional.
166. Note, for example, the sub rosa efforts of trial judges to avoid all-white juries
described supra text accompanying notes 87-96.
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